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ABSTRACT
This study investigates the relationship between ownership structure and firm specific characteristics with capital structure of Malaysian middle-
capital pubic listed firms. Although there are many studies conducted on capital structure, very few examine the connection between ownership 
concentration and ownership dispersion with capital structure particularly in the Malaysian market. By employing a total of 38 middle-capital firms 
covering period from 2008 to 2012, the results show that debt level in firms with high ownership concentration is significantly different from firms 
with low concentration level. It is also found that ownership concentration possess a negative relationship with leverage ratio, the measurement for 
capital structure. This suggests that debt is less likely to be used as monitoring mechanism in highly concentrated firm. This practice could reduce 
debt related financial distress cost, which in turn lower agency cost although it promotes agency cost related to managerial opportunistic behaviour. 
The findings might help investors to understand more about capital structure and help them to judge corporate governance practice of firms based on 
the level of ownership concentration and choice of capital structure.
Keywords: Ownership Concentration, Ownership Dispersion, Capital Structure, Malaysia 
JEL Classification: G32
1. INTRODUCTION
Capital structure choice is one of the most important decisions 
making for a firm because it can affect shareholder’s earnings and 
firm’s value. A heavy reliance on the debt financing would give 
weight on the firm’s risk profile and increase firm’s bankruptcy 
costs. Meanwhile, favouring equity issuance and avoiding debt 
would send wrong signals to investors about firm’s financial 
status and also increase the possibility of hostile takeover. At the 
international level, a number of studies examine the relationship 
between characteristics of firms and their choice of capital 
structure. Most of the studies focus on European firms (Arrondo 
and Gomez-Anson, 2003; Bancel and Mittoo, 2002, 2004; 
Boubaker, 2007), United States of America firms (Baker and 
Wurgler, 2002; Berger et al., 1997) and some of them focus on 
East Asian firms (Booth et al., 2001; Deesomsak et al., 2004; La 
Porta et al., 1999). These studies highlight that capital structure 
decisions are influenced by firm specific characteristics such as 
profitability, size, asset tangibility, and liquidity.
These studies nevertheless, provide inconclusive findings 
regarding the association between firm specific characteristics 
and capital structure. Furthermore, these studies do not focus 
on specific sizes with regard to the market capitalization of their 
sample. The variations in the type of sample firms, markets, and 
sample periods used in prior studies motivate this study to further 
examine the relationship between firm specific characteristics 
with capital structure using Malaysian middle-capital firms’ data.
In addition, this study also investigates the effect of ownership 
concentration and ownership dispersion on leverage level of 
Malaysian middle-capital firms. This is because, Claesens et al., 
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(2002) report that Malaysian firms have high level of ownership 
concentration. Ownership concentration is defined as fraction 
of top 5 largest shareholding of the firm. Empirical evidence by 
Abdullah (2006) highlights that on average, 36% of Malaysian 
firms’ shares are held by single largest shareholder. Based on 
agency theory, large shareholders supposed to have total control 
over firm’s management and governance thus would reflect a 
high favour of using debt in firm’s capital structure as a means to 
control agency problem.
Meanwhile, dispersed ownership structure or dispersed firm has 
only a few, if any large shareholder in the firm. Dispersed firm 
usually has higher number of shareholders with smallholdings and 
these minority shareholders are less likely to involve themselves 
in firms’ management. The lack of shareholder’s involvement 
in the firm has resulted in manager having too much power in 
hand with no or less monitoring than necessary to control their 
actions. Entrenched managers decrease debt financing in order to 
avoid lender’s monitoring and maintain their position in the firm. 
Therefore, a decrease in the number of large shareholder would 
increase manager’s control power over firm and decrease the level 
of leverage in firm’s capital structure.
To the best of our knowledge, there are limited studies that consider 
the association between ownership concentration and ownership 
dispersion with leverage level in Malaysia. By exploring these two 
areas and their relationship, this study might be able to highlight 
the situation regarding rights of shareholder as the entitled owner 
of the firm. Thus, the finding will shed some light on sign of 
entrenchment acts and expropriation by managers.
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 
discusses the related literature. Section 3 describes methodology. 
Section 4 presents the empirical findings and Section 5 concludes 
the study.
2. LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1. Capital Structure Theories
Three related dominant theories that are important and extensively 
reviewed in prior studies are agency theory, trade off theory and 
pecking order theory. In this section, related literature regarding the 
determinants of capital structure and literature on the relationship 
between ownership structure and capital structure are discussed. 
Agency theory developed by Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest 
that capital structure can be manipulated to eliminate or at least 
reduce agency costs.
The trade-off theory proposed by Modigliani and Miller (1963) 
find that theoretically, debt increase firm value because of the 
interest tax shield. However, increase in debt means the firm has 
committed to a greater bankruptcy costs and excessive use of debt 
would bring more harm to the firm when the bankruptcy cost is 
greater than the tax saving advantage. This explain the trade-off 
theory of capital structure that states the amount of tax savings will 
just be offset by the same amount of bankruptcy costs. Although 
exact target debt may not be possible to determine, firms having 
high and consistent profitability with lot of tangible asset to offer 
as collateral security should be able to have a higher debt ratio. 
According to Myers and Majluf (1984), firms that recognize this 
trade off theory would set their target debt then gradually moves 
toward the target.
Pecking order theory developed by Myers and Majluf (1984) 
was based on the assumption that firm will mostly use internal 
financing before resolving to external financing and would prefer 
debt to equity if external financing is used. This creates the order 
of preferable financing: First would be retained earnings, then debt 
and the final option when debt capacity reached its limit would 
be equity. Another assumption made that explains this order is 
because compared to outsiders, managers have greater knowledge 
about the firm’s financial information.
2.2. Ownership Structure and Capital Structure
Agency theory postulates that leverage is one of the effective 
mechanisms to control agency problem. In corporate world, 
manager is the agent appointed by shareholders and given the 
authority to make decision on how to operate the firm in a way 
that could maximize the shareholder’s wealth. The problem 
arises when managers make corporate decision based on their 
best interest instead of the shareholders’. One way to alleviate 
agency cost is by injecting debt in firm’s capital structure which 
would provide outside monitoring by lenders (Agrawal and 
Nagarajan, 1990; Mehran, 1992; Berger et al., 1997; Du and Dai, 
2005). This is because debt could help shareholders to control 
the actions and behaviour of managers. Firms which have high 
ownership concentration are more likely to depend on leverage to 
monitor or control managers’ behavior. Agrawal and Nagarajan 
(1990), Mehran (1992), Berger et al., (1997), Du and Dai (2005) 
and Cespedes et al., (2010) mutually agree that high ownership 
concentration leads to a high intake of leverage.
Another main reason for shareholders to favour debt financing 
is to protect their control rights as the owner of the firm. Major 
shareholders avoid issuing new equity to protect their voting 
rights and maintain their position as controlling shareholder. They 
rather use debt financing than increasing the risk of losing control 
and the possibility of hostile takeover. Therefore, agency theory 
predicts that high level of ownership concentration which reflects 
shareholders’ control on the firm will increase the level of leverage 
in the firm’s capital structure.
Similarly, firms with dispersed ownership shows a manager’s 
preferences over equity financing rather than leverage in order to 
avoid scrutiny monitoring from the debt holders. Antoniou et al., 
(2008) who find lower leverage ratio for the U.S. and U.K. firms 
emphasize that managers prefer for equity financing in dispersed 
ownership structure.
Empirical studies on ownership concentration highlight that high 
concentrated firms tend to have higher debt level (Agrawal and 
Nagarajan, 1990; Mehran, 1992; Berger et al., 1997; Mahrt-Smith, 
2005; Du and Dai, 2005). Despite positive results are found 
between ownership concentration and debt level, there are 
some empirical findings that document an opposite relationship 
(Wiwattanakantang, 1999; Driffield et al., 2007; King and Santor, 
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2008). Shleifer and Vishny (1986) highlight the influence of large 
investors such as banks or institutional investors in monitoring 
activities. They argue that firms with more concentrated ownership 
are expected to have less agency costs related to managerial 
opportunistic behaviour and thus, managers have less need to 
issue debt as their action will be monitored by the concentrated 
shareholders. Wiwattanakantang (1999) who examines 363 non-
financial listed firms in Thailand suggests that a concentrated 
ownership structure induces a higher level of monitoring. This 
in turn implies the reduction in managerial discretion. Driffield 
et al., (2007) report that among East Asian firms, Malaysian firms 
show a negative relationship between ownership concentration 
and leverage ratio. Therefore, debt financing which is used to 
mitigate the moral hazard problem is less widely adopted in highly 
concentrated firms.
On the other hand, firms with dispersed ownership structure usually 
have larger number of shareholders with small shareholdings and 
these minority shareholders are less likely to involve themselves in 
firms’ management. The lack of shareholder’s involvement in the 
firm has resulted in manager having too much power in hand with 
no or less monitoring than necessary to control their actions. The 
extent to which managers are disabled to be disciplined from full 
range of corporate governance and control mechanism is referred 
to the managerial entrenchment hypothesis (Berger et al., 1997). 
Entrenched managers would decrease debt financing in order to 
avoid lender’s monitoring and subsequently maintain their position 
in the firm. To sum up, it is expected that a small number of large 
shareholder would increase manager’s control power over firm 
and thus, decrease the level of leverage in firm’s capital structure. 
Given both positive and negative relationship documented between 
ownership concentration and ownership dispersion respectively 
to debt level, this study hypothesized that:
H1a: There is a relationship between ownership concentration and 
leverage ratio of Malaysian middle-capital firms.
H1b: There is a relationship between ownership dispersion and 
leverage ratio of Malaysian middle-capital firms.
2.3. Firm Specific Characteristics and Capital 
Structure
The pecking order theory posits that if firm issues equity to finance 
a project, it would signals that management is not confident enough 
about the successful rate of the project. Therefore, issuance of 
share is bad news but if debt financing is used on the project, it is 
considered as good news. This is because debt financing signals 
that the management is confident about serving the debt in the 
future, which means the project have a promising prospect. In 
this case, debt is preferred over shares in order to attract investors. 
This theory assumes that managers know more about the firm’s 
capabilities and in order to avoid speculation on the firm’s financial 
status, the management might resolve to finance project by using 
retained earnings as retained earnings is the cheapest form of 
financing.
The empirical evidences on profitability and capital structure 
indicate that profitability will have a negative relationship with 
the leverage ratio because high profitable firms will have more 
internal funds available. Thus, firms would prefer internal funding 
rather than debt financing when they have the excess internal 
funding sources (Deesomsak et al., 2004; Nadaraja et al., 2011; 
Nurul et al., 2011). Thus, hypothesis regarding the relationship 
between profitability and leverage ratio is as follows:
H2: Profitability of Malaysian middle-capital firms has a negative 
relationship with leverage ratio.
In the aspect of firm size, the trade-off theory explains that larger 
firms have higher target debt than smaller firms. Large firms 
exhibit stronger growth, more diversified, consistent profitability, 
and possess more assets than small firm. The financial profiles 
for large firms tend to outperform small firms’ financial profile. 
Thus, the bankruptcy costs for large firms are much lower than 
small firm. Therefore, an increase in firm size will increase the 
debt capacity of the firm. Most of researches have confirmed this 
theory and reported a positive relationship between firm size and 
leverage ratio (Deesomsak et al., 2004; Nadaraja et al., 2011; 
Noriza et al., 2011; Nurul et al.,2011; Nabilah et al., 2012; Fahmi 
and Noryati, 2013; and Mazila et al., 2013). These studies agree 
that firm size is an important determinant of capital structure. 
Thus, it is hypothesized that:
H3: Size of Malaysian middle-capital firms has a positive 
relationship with leverage ratio.
Asset tangibility such as fixed asset is regarded as one of the 
important determinants of firms’ capital structure by most of prior 
literatures. Deesomsak et al., (2004), Suhaila and Wan (2008), 
Nadaraja et al., (2011), Nurul et al., (2011), Nabilah et al., (2012), 
Fahmi and Noryati (2013) and Mazila et al., (2013) report that asset 
tangibility has a significant positive relationship with leverage ratio. 
In this respect, fixed asset function as the collateral to creditors in 
exchange of debt granted. A firm with large amount of fixed asset can 
borrow at relatively lower rate of interest because creditors feel more 
secure with the guarantee assets or collateral promised by the firm 
if they fail to pay back the debt. Myers (1977) states that tangible 
asset such as fixed asset can support a higher debt level compared 
to intangible asset such as growth opportunities. Therefore, the 
more tangible asset firms possess, the greater the firms’ ability to 
increase their debt level. The trade-off theory suggests a positive 
relationship between asset tangibility and leverage ratio. Thus, the 
hypothesis for asset tangibility is as follows:
H4: Asset tangibility of Malaysian middle-capital firms has a 
positive relationship with leverage ratio.
In the aspect of liquidity, the trade-off theory postulates that an 
increase in liquidity will increase the ability of firms to borrow 
more due to high level of cash or liquid assets to serve the interest 
and principal payment on time. High liquidity ratio allows firm 
to have high leverage ratio and this positive relationship is 
confirmed by Nadaraja et al., (2011), Suhaila and Wan (2008) and 
Mazila et al., (2013). However, Deesomsak et al., (2004) find that 
Malaysian firms have a negative relationship between liquidity and 
leverage ratio. The negative relationship describes the pecking 
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order theory in which when the firms’ liquidity is high, the firms 
prefer to use internal funds to finance their operation rather than 
risking their cash or liquid assets to serve debt. Based on the 
arguments, the hypothesis 6 is as follows:
H6: There is a relationship between liquidity and leverage ratio of 
Malaysian middle-capital firms.
As for growth opportunity, the relationship between growth 
opportunity and capital structure can be explained by agency 
and trade off theory. Trade off theory postulates that firms with 
more investment growth opportunities will borrow less to avoid 
committing themselves to debt servicing as intangible asset could 
not be used as collateral. Similarly, according to agency theory, the 
underlying investment problem is more likely to occur due to large 
proportion of firms’ value is in the form of growth opportunities. 
Thus, in order to reduce the agency problem, these firms is less likely 
to use debt. Significant negative relationship is found in these studies 
(see for example Bradley et al., 1984; Gaud et al., 2005; Moh’d et al., 
1998; Rajan and Zingales, 1995). Therefore, it is hypothesized that:
H7: Growth opportunity of Malaysian middle-capital firms has a 
negative relationship with leverage ratio.
3. METHODOLOGY
3.1. Sample Selection
This study uses list of FTSE Bursa Malaysia Mid 701 Index 
component firms which covers an observation period of 5 years 
from 2008 to 2012. The index is a free float adjusted market-
capitalisation weighted index representing the performance of the 
middle largest Malaysian firms, which qualify size, free float and 
liquidity screens (FTSE Monthly Report, 2014). The list2 consists 
of 70 middle-capital firms from various sectors of the Malaysian 
economy. Selection process begins with an elimination of firms 
that involve in financial trading activities and financial institution 
such as banks, bank holdings firms and REIT as these types of 
firms are regulated and use a different accounting procedure. The 
following step involves the elimination of firms that falls under 
Bursa Malaysia’s practice note (PN) 3, PN4 or PN17 status during 
the study period. Next, observations of firms with all-equity 
financed are also excluded from sample. The final process is the 
elimination of firms with missing data such as the absence of 
financial data during the 5 year study period. The final sample 
consists of 38 firms and a total of 190 observations.
Table 1 classifies companies according to seven sectors which are 
infrastructure project companies (IPC), construction, consumer, 
1 The 70 mid cap firms are the next 70 firms in FTSE Bursa Malaysia 
EMAS Index (FBMEMAS), after the 30 largest firms in FBMEMAS. The 
justification for excluding the first top 30 largest stocks in terms of market 
capitalization is because these firms are monopolized by the Institutional 
ownership. The remaining of the constituents in FBMEMAS is considered 
as small capital companies and are not listed on the FTSE Top 100 Index. 
Thus, this study focuses on 70 mid cap firms to avoid inclusion of outliers 
of too big or too small firms in terms of size and market capitalization.
2 The list of 70 mid-cap firms is extracted from Malaysia-mid-70-components 
list http://www.investing.com/indices/ftse). This website provides an up-to-
date list with only four hours delayed information.
industrial products, plantation, properties and trading and services. 
The highest percentage of sample firms is from Trading and 
Services which is accounted about 40%, while firms in IPC is the 
lowest percentage in the sample (2.6%).
3.2. Model Specification
The model which is modified from Rajan and Zingales (1995), 






LEVERAGEit=Leverage of firm i at time t, is measured by using 
the ratio of book value of total debt (short and long term debt) to 
total equity;
PROFITit=Profitability of firm i at time t, measured by ratio of 
operating income to total asset;
SIZEit=Firm size of firm i at time t is measured by logarithm of 
total sales;
TANGIBILITYit=Asset tangibility of firm i at time t, measured 
by ratio of fixed asset to total asset;
LIQUIDITYit=Liquidity of firm i at time t, computed by ratio of 
current asset to current liabilities;
GROWTHit=Growth opportunity of firm i at time t, computed by 
market to book ratio;
TOPit=Ownership concentration variable, measured by the fraction 
of top five largest shareholding of firm i at time t;
DISPERSEit=Ownership dispersion variable, measured by natural 
log of total number of shareholders of firm i at time t and;
ε=Error term.
The equation consists of five firm specific variables (profitability, 
size, asset tangibility, liquidity, and growth opportunity) and two 
ownership structure variables. Previous literature uses numerous 
proxies to measure ownership. In this study, two proxies are used 
Table 1: Profile of sample firms according to Bursa 
Malaysia sectors
Industry Number of firm (%)
IPC (electronic) 1 (2.6)
Construction 3 (7.9)
Consumer 2 (5.3)
Industrial products 7 (18.4)
Plantation 6 (15.8)
Properties 4 (10.5)
Trading and service 15 (39.5)
Total 38 (100)
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to represent ownership structure. The first proxy is Herfindahl 
index where total shareholding of top five largest shareholders is 
computed. This proxy is used by Nor and Sulong (2007), Khan 
(2006) and Suto (2003). Another proxy is ownership dispersion, an 
inverse relationship with ownership concentration. It is measured by 
the natural log of total number of shareholders. This study follows 
Rozeff (1982) who states that theoretically, if the firm’s shares are 
held by a greater number of shareholders, this will suggest a more 
dispersed ownership or low level of ownership concentration while 
less number of shareholders will indicate a high ownership. The use 
of natural log of number of outstanding shareholders allows this study 
to neutralize the differences in the number of shareholders between 
firms, where this method is also used by Moh’d et al., (1998).
4. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
4.1. Descriptive Statistics
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistic of all variables used in 
this study. From the table, it shows that Malaysian middle-capital 
firms have an average of the following variables: LEVERAGE 
of 24.9%, PROFIT of 7.4%, SIZE of 6.121, TANGIBILITY of 
39.9%, LIQUIDITY of 1.871, GROWTH of 1.631, TOP of 56.2% 
and DISPERSE of 9.132. An average leverage ratio of 25% is 
similar to the 24% reported by Ganguli (2013) in his study on 
Indian middle-capital firms.
4.2. Univariate Analysis
Table 3 provides the independent t-test of the mean of subsample 
groups of ownership structures proxies: Ownership concentration 
(shown in Panel A) and ownership dispersion (shown in Panel B). 
In Panel A, sample firms are divided into two groups based on the 
median value of 56.6% in percentage of shareholding for top 5 largest 
shareholders: Highly concentrated firms (firms with higher than 
median ownership concentration) and low concentrated firms (firms 
with lower than median ownership concentration). Independent 
t-test is performed to check whether two groups are different. 
Results show that the significance level is small (P = 0.0083), thus 
equal variance not assumed t-test statistic should be used. It can be 
concluded that the leverage level for the high concentrated firms 
and low concentrated firms are significantly different. Similar test 
is also conducted for examining the difference between high and 
low ownership dispersion and the results is reported in Panel B. 
The results show that sample with high ownership dispersion is 
significantly different from low ownership dispersion. This also 
implies that leverage level of the two groups is different.
4.3. Correlation Analysis
Before a multivariate analysis is performed, multicollinearity 
tests and correlation test are conducted. Table 4 shows a 
correlation coefficient for all variables. The variables are 
considered to have a strong relationship between each other 
when their correlation coefficient value is more than 80%. 
The highest correlation coefficient value is −0.522, which is 
between profitability and the natural log of total shareholders. 
Overall, multicollinearity does not appear to be a problem in 
this study.
4.4. Multivariate Analysis
Table 5 presents results of four different models using 
ordinary least squares (OLS) and fixed effect estimation. 
A fixed effects model is used to control for the unobservable 
behaviour of firms’ specific characteristics,  such as 
management quality and firm policies that may affect the 
capital structure decision. Model 1 and Model 2 report 
the results of OLS regression, while Model 3 and Model 4 
exhibit the results of fixed effect estimations. Results of OLS 
regression and fixed effect estimation show that three firm 
specific variables, PROFIT, SIZE and TANGIBILITY are 
statistically significant in all models. In this respect, firm size 
(SIZE) and asset tangibility (TANGIBILITY) are found to be 
significantly positive with leverage ratio, while the coefficient 
for profitability (PROFIT) exhibits a negative correlation with 
leverage ratio.
The positive and significant coefficient of SIZE is consistent 
with the trade-off theory that suggests larger firms have 
higher target debt level than smaller firms. This means 
that an increase in firm size will increase the debt capacity 
of the firm. Meanwhile, significant positive coefficient of 
TANGIBILITY suggests that firm with large amount of fixed 
asset can borrow at relatively lower rate of interest because 
creditors feel more secured with the guaranteed assets or 
collateral promised by the firm if they fail to pay back the debt. 
This result supports all of prior studies (see for example Fahmi 
and Noryati, 2013; Mazila et al., 2013; Nabilah et al., 2012; 
Deesomsak et al., 2004; Nadaraja et al., 2011; Noriza et al., 
2011; Nurul et al., 2011).
Profitability (PROFIT) has a negative relationship with 
leverage ratio which is consistent with the pecking order theory. 
A significant negative relationship infers that high profitable 
firms will have more internal funds available, and this implies 
that Malaysian middle-capital firms prefer internal funding when 
they have an excess of internal funding sources. The results are 
consistent with Deesomsak et al., (2004), Nadaraja et al., (2011), 
Noriza et al., (2011), and Nurul et al., (2011) who mutually agree 
that profitability negatively influence the Malaysian firms’ capital 
structure.
Table 2: Descriptive statistics
Variable
Leverage Profit Size Tangibility Liquidity Growth TOP Disperse
Mean 0.249 0.074 6.121 0.399 1.871 1.631 0.562 9.132
Minimum 0.0003 −0.163 4.862 0.039 0.311 0.240 0.168 7.129
Maximum 0.772 0.372 7.201 0.883 10.127 7.230 0.872 11.147
Median 0.244 0.066 6.091 0.397 1.657 1.505 0.566 9.132
Standard deviation 0.159 0.072 0.481 0.195 1.196 0.980 0.164 0.883
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Models that incorporate ownership concentration variable (TOP) 
are described in Model 1, Model 3 and Model 4, while model that 
incorporate the ownership dispersion variable (DISPERSE) is 
shown in Model 2. The models reveal contradict results between 
the two proxies. TOP is statistically and negatively significant, 
while DISPERSE is insignificant. The negative and significant 
result of ownership concentration (TOP) is consistent with the 
view that shareholders will gain less benefit from debt owing to 
larger monitoring roles by major investors. In similar vein, results 
from this study support managerial entrenchment hypothesis which 
argues that shareholders with low ownership concentration are 
not able to play an active role in management. Thus, this would 
lead to managerial entrenchment behaviour. Managers for this 
type of company prefer low debt level than optimal debt level due 
to a desire to secure their human capital and avoid performance 
pressures related to commitments to disgorge large amount of 
cash. The findings of this study does not support premise of agency 
theory which postulates that debt reduces agency cost by bringing 
in extra monitoring over management.
5. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
This study investigates the relationship between firm specific 
characteristics and ownership structure with capital structure of 
middle-capital firms listed in Bursa Malaysia during the period 
of 2008 to 2012. In specific, this study analyses the effect of 
leverage level in high concentrated and low concentrated firms. 
The leverage level is much lower in highly concentrated firms. The 
findings provide new insights into the link of corporate governance 
practice and debt financing as substitutes to reduce agency cost. 
The findings also reveal that firm size and asset tangibility 
positively influence the leverage level while profitability 
negatively influences the leverage level of middle-capital firms 
in Malaysia.
This study examines only two proxies for ownership structure, 
which are concentrated ownership and dispersed ownership. Future 
research could explore other perspectives that are more relevant 
to Malaysian context such as family ownership, managerial 
ownership, outsiders’ ownership, and foreign ownership to find 
their relationship with capital structure. Finally, a larger sample 
of Malaysian firms with longer period of study or at least cover 
Table 4: Pearson’s correlation analysis
Leverage Profit Size Tangibility Liquidity Growth TOP Disperse
Leverage 1.000
Profit −0.354*** 1.000
Size 0.282*** −0.242*** 1.000
Tangibility 0.214 0.069 −0.255 1.000
Liquidity −0.304 0.242 −0.279 −0.263 1.000
Growth −0.073 0.304*** 0.117 −0.014 0.058 1.000
TOP −0.197*** 0.071 0.044 −0.021 0.161** −0.054 1.000
Disperse 0.262*** −0.522*** 0.444*** −0.178** −0.163** −0.181** −0.147** 1.000
***, **Indicates significance level of 1% and 5%, respectively
Table 5: Regression result
Independent 
variables
Dependent variable: Leverage 
Model 1(OLS) Model 2 (OLS) Model 3 (fixed effects) Model 4 (fixed effects)
Const −0.260 (0.108) −0.345 (0.063) −0.2655 (0.1053) 0.2495 (0.1249)
Profit −0.599*** (0.000) −0.586*** (0.001) −0.5996*** (0.0002) −0.3336** (0.0168)
Size 0.094*** (0.000) 0.079*** (0.002) 0.0980*** (0.0001) 0.0560*** (0.0060)
Tangibility 0.234*** (0.000) 0.227*** (0.000) 0.2392*** (0.000)  0.3760*** (0.000)
Liquidity −0.007 (0.462) −0.012 (0.212) −0.0064 (0.5059) −0.0224*** (0.0046)
Growth −0.004 (0.702) 0.000 (0.983) −0.0026 (0.8153) −0.0170 (0.0545**)
TOP −0.171***(0.006) −0.1796*** (0.0047) −0.1849*** (0.0003)
Disperse 0.009 (0.534)
Year dummy No No Yes No
Industry dummy No No No Yes
Number of observation 190 190 190 190
Adjusted R2 (%) 26.79 23.88 25.73 55.41
F-value 12.53*** (0.000) 10.88*** (0.000) 7.55*** (0.000) 20.58*** (0.000)
*** and **denotes significance level of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively, LEVERAGEit is measured by ratio of book value of total debt (short and long term debt) to total equity, PROFITit 
is measured by ratio of operating income to total asset, SIZEit is measured by logarithm of total sales, TANGIBILITYit is measured by ratio of fixed asset to total asset, LIQUIDITYit 
is computed by ratio of current asset to current liabilities, GROWTHit is measured by ratio of market to book ratio, TOPit is measured by the fraction of top five largest shareholding, 
DISPERSEit is measured by total number of shareholders
Table 3: Results of two groups mean comparison test
Sub‑sample group Mean Independent t-test
t-stat P value








Panel B: Number of category of 
shareholders (Disperse)
Ownership dispersion >9.132 0.2899 3.6874 0.0001***
Ownership dispersion of <9.132 0.2077
***P<0.01
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a certain period study such as recession phase, booming phase, 
recovery phase and stable phase could also be employed in the 
future research.
Since the observation of this study focuses solely on Malaysian 
middle-capital firms, the finding of this study could not represent 
the current practice of Malaysia’s corporate governance in other 
capital sizes of firms. Further study could be done on examining 
the practice of Malaysia’s corporate governance (MCCG 2012) 
that focuses on the area of shareholder’s protection using different 
approach, method and variable. This could include an extension 
to a study that measure shareholders’ rights’ as in Gompers et al. 
(2003).
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